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Developments in Administrative
Law: The 2004-2005 Term
Laverne Jacobs*

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2004-2005 Supreme Court term was marked by the Court’s
emphasis on respect for legislative intent and for the administrative
processes developed by the state. This dual theme manifested itself in
various ways and was apparent in all the cases decided this term. However, if there was consensus on the aspiration to be achieved, the Court
was far from unanimous in deciding on the best method to realize this
objective, making for a very lively term of administrative law decisionmaking.
During the 2004-2005 term, the Supreme Court addressed four major issues. The Court revisited the issue of exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction, revealing deep divides in its opinion of the correct approach
to be taken to determine which adjudicative body has jurisdiction when
more than one appear capable of being seized of a matter. On the subject
of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, there have been four key cases.
In Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney General);1 Quebec (Attorney General) v.
Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal)2 and Canada (House of Commons) v.
Vaid,3 the Court considered the competing jurisdictions of human rights
tribunals and another statutory regime. In Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson
School Board,4 the Court examined the issue of the residual remedial
*

B.A. (Hons.) (McGill), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill); Ph.D Candidate, SSHRC Canada Graduate
Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School. Thanks to Lorne Sossin and Thomas Kuttner for their comments on a draft of this article.
1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 34, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185 [hereinafter “Morin”].
2
[2004] S.C.J. No. 35, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter “Charette”].
3
[2005] S.C.J. No. 28, 2005 SCC 30 [hereinafter “Vaid”].
4
Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General);
Zorilla v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 257 [hereinafter
“Okwuobi”].
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jurisdiction of superior courts to provide relief in constitutional matters
over which a tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. The Court looked at the
relationship between the exclusive jurisdiction of the Administrative
Tribunal of Quebec and the Superior Court with respect to the power to
grant constitutional remedies and offered guidance in this respect. By
far, the most significant amount of the Supreme Court’s administrative
law energy was spent last term on questions relating to exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction. Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area
and the many questions left unanswered, issues relating to exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction will undoubtedly continue to plague the Court in
the future.
Additional administrative law issues addressed by the Supreme Court
this term include the right to independent adjudication, discussed in
Vaughan v. Canada;5 the standard of review at a secondary level of appellate review, explored in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)6 and another look at expertise and deference in Monsanto
Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services).7
While the number of administrative law cases decided this term has
not been numerous, the decisions rendered have been rich, provocative
and telling of the areas where the Court is unified and of those where it
will have to return to solidify its guiding principles. This article discusses the seven administrative law cases decided during the 2004-2005
term,8 examining them along the lines of the four major issues addressed
by the Court: (1) Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction, (2) The Right
to Independent Adjudication, (3) Standard of Review and (4) Expertise
and Deference.

5

[2005] S.C.J. No. 12, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 146 [hereinafter “Vaughan”]. It should be noted
that Vaughan is a case that also deals with exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. The importance of
the case to the administrative law jurisprudence relating to procedural fairness and independent
adjudication has led to its placement in a separate category.
6
[2005] S.C.J. No. 39, 2005 SCC 40 [hereinafter “Mugesera”].
7
[2004] S.C.J. No. 51, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 [hereinafter “Monsanto”].
8
Two of these, the companion cases of Morin and Charette, were decided a few weeks
before the end of the 2003-2004 term.
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II. EXCLUSIVE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
It has been 10 years since the decision in Weber v. Ontario Hydro.9
However, the fire raging around the issues of concurrent and exclusive
jurisdiction continues to flare. In Weber, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the arbitration process established through labour relations regimes precludes courts of common law from addressing
the same matters. Mr. Weber, a unionized worker, had attempted to sue
his employer in tort and for breach of his Charter rights over a workrelated dispute. The employer succeeded in having the actions dismissed
on the ground that the province’s Labour Relations Act10 and the terms
of the collective agreement together created an exclusive system of
arbitration. As a result of this exclusive jurisdiction, any disputes which,
in their essential character, arose expressly or inferentially from the
collective agreement were foreclosed to the courts. In adopting the exclusive jurisdiction model for the unionized labour context, the Supreme
Court rejected the overlapping and concurrent models.11 Since Weber,
several cases have upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators.
In addition, the principles of Weber have expanded beyond the labour
context to other legislated decision-making schemes. They have also
extended beyond jurisdictional conflict between courts and tribunals to
address questions of jurisdictional conflict between tribunals as well.12
In the past year, the Supreme Court furthered the debate started in
Weber by revisiting the issue of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction in
four noteworthy cases: Morin, Charette, Vaid and Okwuobi.

9

[1995] S.C.J. No. 59, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 [hereinafter “Weber”].
R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2.
11
For a discussion of Weber, see Philip L. Bryden, “Developments in Administrative Law:
The 1994-1995 Term” (1996) 7 S.C.L.R. (2d) 27.
12
Literature on the impact of Weber includes: Bernard Adell, “Jurisdictional Overlap Between Arbitration and Other Forums: An Update” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 179; Ray Brown and Brian
Etherington, “Weber v. Ontario Hydro: A Denial of Access to Justice for the Organized Employee?” (1996) 4 C.L.E.L.J. 183; Donald D. Carter, “Looking at Weber Five Years Later: Is it time
for a New Approach?” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 231; Richard MacDowell, “Labour Arbitration — The
New Labour Court?” (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 121.
10
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1. Determining Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae Between Competing
Tribunals: Morin, Charette and Vaid
Morin and Charette raise important questions about the manner of
determining legislative intent when dealing with competing administrative regimes. In particular, the Court reveals significant disagreements
over the application of the “essential character” test — the test that
figures centrally in administrative law to determine legislative intent
when there are competing jurisdictions. These cases are followed by
Vaid, which takes a much more subdued approach to the same issue,
although leaving many of the unanswered questions untouched. All
three cases deal with a Human Rights Tribunal as one of the competing
administrative schemes, which also makes one wonder about the effect
of these cases on statutory human rights regimes.
This section presents a detailed and critical overview of these cases,
focusing on the debates between members of the Court.
(a) Morin
In 1997, several teachers’ unions entered into a modification of a
collective agreement that they held with the province of Quebec. The
modification discounted experience acquired during the 1996-1997
school year, with the result that the 1996-1997 year would not be credited in calculating salary increments or seniority. A minority group
made up of younger and less experienced teachers were the only ones
affected by the modified term. They complained to the Quebec Human
Rights Commission that the newly negotiated term was discriminatory.
The Commission brought the matter before the Quebec Human Rights
Tribunal, asking for a declaration that the terms of the collective agreement violated the equality provisions of the Quebec Charter of human
rights and freedoms.13
The Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdiction was questioned at the
hearing. The Attorney General of Quebec along with the school boards
and the unions filed preliminary motions arguing that labour arbitrators
had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute and requesting the Human
Rights Tribunal to decline hearing the matter. Although the Human

13

R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”].
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Rights Tribunal rejected the motion,14 on appeal to the Quebec Court of
Appeal, it was held that the proper forum for resolving this dispute was
the process of arbitration set up under the collective agreement.15 At
issue, therefore, before the Supreme Court was whether the legislature
intended the Human Rights Tribunal or labour arbitration to be the forum in which this type of dispute would be heard and the test that should
be applied to resolve such conflicts of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Human Rights Tribunal
had jurisdiction over the dispute. However, their decision contained
majority and dissenting reasons. The majority was represented by
McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major, Binnie and Fish JJ. Their reasons
were authored by McLachlin C.J. The dissenting judges were Bastarache and Arbour JJ. with reasons written by Bastarache J.
(i) The Majority
Chief Justice McLachlin framed the issue in this case as being
whether the Human Rights Tribunal should be barred from hearing a
complaint of discrimination because the labour arbitrator has exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute.16 She confirmed that the approach to be
taken in the labour context to decide which of two possible tribunals
should hear a dispute derives from Weber and clarified the propositions
for which Weber stands in her view. First, Weber indicates that there are
three models of jurisdiction: concurrent, overlapping, and exclusive, and
that all three models are legally possible. Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized explicitly that Weber does not stand for the proposition that
labour arbitrators always have exclusive jurisdiction in employer-union
disputes. She also reminded us that it is not possible to stand back and
theoretically classify cases into categories of matters that will and will
not fall within the exclusive authority of arbitrators.
Second, on a more general level, in order to determine which of
the three models should prevail in a given situation, Weber holds that
it is important to consider “the governing legislation, as applied to the
dispute viewed in its factual matrix.”17 As she proceeded through her

14
15
16
17

[2000] J.T.D.P.Q. no. 24.
[2002] Q.J. No. 365 (C.A.).
Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
Id., at para 11.
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reasons, the Chief Justice offered a two-step test for conducting this
analysis. The first step involves examining the relevant legislation and
what it says about the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The second calls for
scrutiny of the nature of the dispute to see whether the legislation
suggests that this particular dispute should fall exclusively to the arbitrator. At this stage, the dispute is to be examined in its full factual
context, which requires disregarding the dispute’s legal characterization. The fact that a dispute has been labelled a tort claim, a human
rights claim or any other type of claim by the parties etc., is not a determinative indication of which body has jurisdiction. By contrast, one
must look for the “essential character” of the dispute — that is, the nature of the dispute informed by its full factual matrix — to see if it falls
within the legislated province of an arbitrator’s exclusive jurisdiction.18
Examining the provisions of the two relevant pieces of legislation
— the Quebec Labour Code19 and the Quebec Charter, McLachlin C.J.
determined that the arbitrator possessed jurisdiction to resolve all disagreements arising over the interpretation or application of a collective
agreement. She noted that in Weber, this jurisdiction was found to be
exclusive. The Human Rights Tribunal, on the other hand, had vast
jurisdiction over human rights matters in Quebec and the power to apply
the Quebec Charter in a wide range of circumstances. Its decisionmaking authority over human rights violations could not be said to be
exclusive, though, as it was clear from the way that the Quebec Charter
had been drafted that the legislator envisaged jurisdictional concurrency
with other adjudicative bodies.20
As for the essential character of the dispute, McLachlin C.J. held
that the essential character is discrimination in the context of negotiating
a collective agreement. As this is a matter that fell outside of the scope
of labour arbitration, the Human Rights Tribunal was entitled to exercise its jurisdiction. Chief Justice McLachlin’s conclusion rests primarily on the finding that the facts of the dispute did not deal with the
interpretation or application of the collective agreement — the domain
over which the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction according to the
Quebec Labour Code. Rather, the issue in dispute dealt with alleged
discrimination during the period of negotiation of the modified term, a
18
19
20

Id., at para. 20.
R.S.Q., c. C-27.
Supra, note 1, at para. 19.
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period preceding the establishment of the agreement itself. In other
words, while it is clear that the Labour Code provides that the arbitrator
has jurisdiction over all grievances arising from the “interpretation or
application” of the collective agreement, the dispute in this case did not
arise from either the interpretation or the application of the agreement
but during a stage that predated the agreement itself. As McLachlin C.J.
observed:
[e]veryone agrees on how the agreement, if valid, should be
interpreted and applied. The only question is whether the process
leading to the adoption of the alleged discriminatory clause and the
inclusion of that clause in the agreement violates the Quebec Charter,
rendering unenforceable21

In her view, the main fact animating the dispute was that the modified term treated the complainants less favourably than more senior
teachers. Its essence was potential discrimination in the process of negotiation and in the inclusion of the term in the collective agreement. Chief
Justice McLachlin held that the Tribunal had the power to deal with this
matter. The matter fell outside of the scope of the arbitrator’s exclusive
jurisdiction and the Human Rights Commission and Tribunal were created by the legislature to resolve precisely these sorts of issues.
The Chief Justice completed her reasons by addressing a final argument that had been raised to contest the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It had
been argued that the complainants could have had their concerns heard
by asking the union to bring a grievance to arbitration under the collective agreement. Chief Justice McLachlin rejected this argument on three
grounds. First, she repeated that the dispute could not be characterized
as a grievance under the collective agreement since the claim was not
that the agreement was violated, but that the nature of the agreement
itself was discriminatory. She added that it might be possible for an
arbitrator to consider such questions as an incidental matter to a dispute
that arose under the collective agreement, but that in this particular
dispute, the complainants could not be faulted for pursuing their claim at
the Human Rights Commission and Tribunal. Moreover, McLachlin C.J.
pointed out that the unions and the complainants were opposed in interest in this matter since the union was affiliated with one of the parties

21

Id., at para. 24.
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that negotiated the agreement. It is possible that the union would not
have chosen to file a grievance on the complainants’ behalf. If that had
occurred, there would have been no effective recourse for the affected
teachers to bring their complaint. Relying on the grievance process
would have provided the complainants with only the hope but not the
guarantee of resolving their dispute.
Finally, McLachlin C.J. asserted that the Human Rights Tribunal
was a “better fit” for this dispute, a comment which garnered significant
reaction in the dissenting opinion. The Chief Justice reasoned that because the challenge had widespread implications, affecting hundreds of
teachers, the Human Rights Tribunal was a better suited forum than the
appointment of an arbitrator to deal with a single grievance within the
framework of the Labour Code.
(ii) The Dissent
Justice Bastarache’s dissenting reasons centre on two main subjects:
the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators and the integration of fundamental rights into the arbitration process. He also offered policy reasons for
why exclusive arbitral jurisdiction should be fostered. Justice Bastarache was very clear to set out his starting premise — namely, that exclusive arbitral jurisdiction is a well-established principle in Quebec law
in the context of labour relations. From this perspective, he viewed the
issue to be resolved in Morin as whether the principle of exclusive jurisdiction should be abandoned in favour of a statutory human rights regime in cases where the labour dispute raises a human rights issue. His
conclusion was that the dispute in Morin should have remained within
the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration. He found that the matter
in dispute was one relating to the application of the collective agreement, since its essential character concerned pay and the reimbursement
of lost wages resulting from the refusal to recognize experience. Most
interesting is his analysis, which brings to light some very deep and
critical disagreements in the Court over the primacy of the exclusive
jurisdiction model and the nature and application of the essential character test. In order to best view these divergences and their significance, it
is useful to organize and consider his analysis along three themes: (A)
models of jurisdiction (B) the essential character test and (C) the incorporation of human rights into labour arbitration.
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(A) MODELS OF JURISDICTION — THREE MODELS OR ONE?
Perhaps the most surprising statement to come out of the decision in
Morin is the majority’s holding that Weber stands for the proposition
that all the three models of jurisdiction — exclusive, concurrent and
overlapping — are possible and that exclusive arbitral jurisdiction was
never meant to be the standard model used in employer-union disputes.
There is no presumption of arbitral exclusivity in abstracto; it is always
a question of determining whether the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in light of the factual context and relevant legislation.22 The majority also implied that other tribunals may possess
exclusive jurisdiction in a labour dispute, depending on the legislation
and the nature of the dispute.23 This interpretation seems to go against
the principles developed in Weber itself, principles which the Supreme
Court has since held consistently, as illustrated by key decisions such as
New Brunswick v. O’Leary,24 Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City)
Board of Police Commissioners25 and Parry Sound (District) Social
Services Administration Board v. Ontario Public Service Employees
Union, Local 324 (O.P.S.E.U.).26
Justice Bastarache was quick to disagree with the majority, whom
he perceived to have abandoned its own precedent. He pointed out that
the “Court has, on numerous occasions and in a variety of legislative
contexts, recognized that arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction over
issues arising from the interpretation, application, administration or
violation of a collective agreement.”27 In Weber, the exclusive jurisdiction model had been adopted for three reasons. It continued the path of
earlier jurisprudence, the statutory language provided for exclusive
jurisdiction, and it helped promote the speedy, economic, final, and
enforceable resolution of labour disputes. In his opinion, McLachlin C.J.
abandoned the exclusive jurisdiction model (and the essential character

22

Id., at para. 14.
Id., at para. 11.
24
[1995] S.C.J. No. 60, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 967 [hereinafter “O’Leary”]. This was the companion case to Weber.
25
[2000] S.C.J. No. 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360 [hereinafter “Regina Police”].
26
[2003] S.C.J. No. 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “Parry Sound”].
27
Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 43.
23
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test that accompanies it) for the “best fit approach”, an approach which
he argued had been rejected already in Weber.28
What is one to make of the Supreme Court’s change in position?
Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons seem to suggest that Weber should
simply be read more narrowly than it has been in the past. She noted
that exclusive arbitral jurisdiction was found in Weber because the language of the statute indicated exclusivity over certain matters and the
facts fit within this reach. Yet, the reasons offered in Weber for finding
exclusive jurisdiction were based not only in the statutory language, but
also on broader policy reasons such as fostering the resolution of all
labour disputes in one dispute resolution process so that they can be
done quickly and economically. Strangely, as Bastarache J. pointed
out,29 it was McLachlin C.J. herself who enounced this principle in Weber, holding that the exclusive jurisdiction model “satisfies the concern
that the dispute resolution process which the various labour statutes of
this country have established should not be duplicated and undermined
by concurrent actions.”30
Chief Justice McLachlin also asserted that there is no principle of
exclusivity in abstracto as Bastarache J. had held with respect to arbitral jurisdiction. But Bastarache J. placed much emphasis on defending
the idea that the Quebec Labour Code is an exclusive and comprehensive decision-making scheme designed by the legislature to govern all
aspects of labour relations in unionized contexts. He referred to provisions of the Labour Code to illustrate that the legislator’s intent was to
create such an exclusive and comprehensive scheme. He highlighted
that the Labour Code mandates that “every grievance” be submitted to
arbitration and that this is similar in spirit to the Ontario Labour Relations Act, examined in Weber, which required “all differences” to be
sent to arbitration. Since the Ontario Act was found to attract the exclusive jurisdiction model in Weber, the Labour Code should have the
same result too. That Morin will undoubtedly have practical ramifications for labour relations is clear, for as Bastarache J. and the Court of
Appeal in Morin point out, many years of jurisprudence have been

28

Id., at para. 45.
Id., at para. 43.
30
Weber, supra, note 9, at para. 58. See as well the dicta of McLachlin J. (as she then
was), at para. 46 of Weber.
29
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built on the original Weber principles, including much of the labour
jurisprudence in Quebec.31
Viewed from another perspective, the change in position in Morin
could be seen as an attempt by the Court to champion the primacy of
legislative intention while reducing judicial policy development in matters mandated to the administrative state. If this is the case, it fits quite
well within the broader movement of the Supreme Court to privilege
legislative will. Seen most acutely in cases like Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v.
British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing
Branch),32 the drive to establish and follow the will of the legislature has
also become quite prevalent in other areas of administrative law, most
notably in the standard of review jurisprudence.33
But if McLachlin C.J.’s goal is indeed to keep within the framework
of the legislator’s intention, then it is hard to reconcile this with her final
reason for holding that the Human Rights Tribunal was the correct forum. As noted, McLachlin C.J. added that the Human Rights Tribunal is
a “better fit” for the dispute since the dispute has implications for hundreds of other teachers. A finding of the most appropriate forum based
on legislative intent would presumably rest solely on the legislation and
the facts. It may be that the collective aspect is an implicit legislative
goal, but certainly the fact of relying on this goal as existing implicitly
would need to be expressed more clearly in order to avoid the criticism
that Bastarache J. makes that choosing the forum that the Court sees as
best suited was denounced back in Weber.34 It will be interesting to see
how the court balances legislative intent with judicial policy making as
it develops its jurisprudence on jurisdiction ratione materiae in the
future.

31

See Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 51 and the Court of Appeal decision, Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) c. Québec (Procureure générale),
[2002] J.Q. no. 365, at paras. 106 and 107.
32
[2001] S.C.J. No. 17, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 [hereinafter “Ocean Port”].
33
See for example, Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick
Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 [hereinafter
“Bibeault”]; Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2
S.C.R. 557; Director of Investigation and Research v. Southam Inc. et al. (1997), 144 D.L.R. (4th)
1 and Pushpanathan v.Canada (Min. of Citizenship), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
34
One could even take Bastarache J.’s argument further by observing that the recent reversal of the Supreme Court’s position on the ability of tribunals to decide Charter matters marks a
more recent denunciation of the view that the appropriate way to determine the correct fora for
disputes is by simple judicial evaluation of which forum is best suited.
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(B) THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER TEST
Both the majority and dissent formulate the essential character test
in a similar way. The test requires an examination of the nature of the
dispute to determine if it falls within the realm of matters over which the
legislature has granted the arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction. In establishing the essential character, one is to analyze the facts giving rise to the
dispute and take guidance from them. The majority and the dissent also
agree in principle that legal characterization should not be a determinative factor. Nevertheless, despite the similarity in their manners of formulating the test, the majority and dissent reach quite opposite results
about the essential character of the teachers’ claim in Morin.
Unlike McLachlin C.J. for the majority, Bastarache J. had no difficulty seeing the facts of this case as an instance of the application of the
collective agreement. In his view, the essential character of the dispute
dealt with pay and the recognition of teaching experience, two issues at
the heart of working conditions. Justice Bastarache asserted further that
the issue in this case concerned the reimbursement of lost wages stemming from lack of recognition of the teaching experience in question.
This, too, were within the scope of the collective agreement.
Moreover, Bastarache J. criticized the majority for misapplying the
test. He noted a change of course in the way that the majority had
analyzed the issue in this case. In his view, they took into account the
legal characterization of the matter as being important though nondeterminative of the matter.35 Justice Bastarache was of the opinion
that McLachlin C.J. relied too heavily on the nature of the right invoked: she merely characterized the grievance as the assertion of a
Quebec Charter right and concluded that such an assertion, in its essential character, did not arise from the interpretation or application of
the collective agreement.36
As for the Chief Justice’s holding that the phase during which a collective agreement is negotiated does not fall within an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, Bastarache J. made two counterpoints. First, the negotiation of a
collective agreement is not the same as the creation of a contract before
the collective agreement is signed. In the latter case, Canadian courts
have held that arbitrators do not have jurisdiction if the matter is not

35
36

Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 46.
Id., at para. 55.
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related to the collective agreement. Here, the negotiation was closely
linked to the application of the agreement. Second, it is not a simple
matter to separate negotiations from the collective agreement itself.
Under the Labour Code, a collective agreement represents a collection
of provisions negotiated by the parties. In this case, it was not the negotiations that caused the alleged harm but the effect of the negotiations —
that is, the provision resulting from the modification. Overall, Bastarache J. found that the essential character of the dispute related to the
application of the collective agreement and, as such, fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
Justice Bastarache’s analysis of the essential character raises questions about the framework within which we are to work when determining the essential nature of the dispute. Are we to look at the “facts
surrounding the dispute” or the “facts giving rise to the dispute”? Both
expressions have been used in the Supreme Court case law37 and while
the difference in wording seems minor, the effect can be significant. In
the case of Morin, the dissenting judges considered the facts surrounding the dispute and this led to a much broader scope of potentially relevant facts. They looked not only to what has happened in the past but
also to the purpose and result of the application before the Court:
In the case at bar, an examination of the factual context shows that the
dispute, in its essential character, concerns pay and the taking into
account of experience gained during the 1996-1997 school year for the
purpose of setting pay. Such issues form the very foundation of a
contract and working conditions. More specifically, this application
concerns the reimbursement of lost wages resulting from the refusal to
recognize experience gained over the 1996-1997 school year, an issue
that is clearly within the scope of the collective agreement. 38

The approach of the dissent contrasts with that of the majority
judges who searched for the catalyst of the disagreement. Drawing a
distinction between Morin and Weber, for example, McLachlin C.J.
wrote:
37

The expression “the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties” can be found in
Regina Police, supra, note 25 and in the dissent in Morin, id., at paras. 53 and 56. Both Regina
Police and the dissent in Morin were authored by Bastarache J. who seems to favour this formulation: “the facts giving rise to the dispute” is employed; Weber, supra, note 9, at para. 29 and in
Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 93. The idea is used in the majority decision in Morin.
38
Morin, id., at para. 57 (emphasis added).
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[…] the critical difference between Weber and this case lies in the
factual context that gave rise to the dispute.
In Weber, the dispute clearly arose out of the operation of the
collective agreement. It was basically a dispute about sick-leave,
which became encumbered with an incidental claim for trespass. In
these circumstances, the majority of the Court concluded that it fell
squarely within s. 45 and should be determined exclusively by the
labour arbitrator.
Here, the same cannot be said. Taking the dispute in its factual
context, as Weber instructs, the main fact that animates the dispute
between the parties is that the collective agreement contains a term
that treats the complainants and members of their group — those
teachers who had not yet attained the highest level of the pay scale
who were typically younger and less experienced — less favourably
than more senior teachers.39

The discussions of both the majority and the dissent lead one to ask
about the guideposts that should be used to help discern the essential
character of a matter. Justice Bastarache’s description of the facts goes
as far as to include the remedies sought, while McLachlin C.J.’s interpretation of the factual matrix sticks very closely to the incidents that
occurred. Is one approach more acceptable than another? Should there
be limitations to what constitutes facts? Given the malleability of the
findings regarding essential character seen in Morin, as well as in Charette and Vaid discussed below, one wonders if such determinations are
being made most effectively through primary reliance on the test for
essential character as it currently exists.
(C) INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO LABOUR ARBITRATION
Justice Bastarache, in dissent, held that every collective agreement
implicitly incorporates the substantive human rights and obligations
provided by human rights legislation. This principle is drawn from
Parry Sound. Justice Bastarache noted that not only are human rights
and obligations incorporated implicitly into all collective agreements but
that in this case, the rights and obligations guaranteed by the Quebec
Charter had actually been expressly incorporated into the collective
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agreement.40 As a consequence, Bastarache J. held that even if the dispute’s essential character was found to be a human rights issue in this
case, it still should have been rightfully addressed through arbitration.
Justice Bastarache finished his judgment by offering a set of primarily policy-based reasons for courts to find that labour arbitrators should
take on, as often as possible, human rights matters that are incidental to
their mandate. He indicated that we need a single entity to address all
issues because it fosters the development of a general culture of respect
for human rights in Quebec’s administrative system. In his view, such
an approach is consistent with the will of the Quebec legislature, which
has not made jurisdiction over human rights matters exclusive to the
Human Rights Tribunal. Having arbitrators decide incidental human
rights matters is also logical, as the arbitrator will be in a good position
to make determinations that take a holistic view of the repercussions for
the rest of the collective agreement. Finally, in addition to reducing the
difficulties of deciding when matters should be removed to another
forum, exclusive jurisdiction avoids causing violence to the comprehensive statutory scheme created to govern labour matters and works to
ensure that citizens can have Charter issues resolved in a prompt, inexpensive and informal way.
The value of having administrative bodies other than human rights
tribunals decide incidental human rights matters in the course of their
mandated work is a theme that Bastarache J. developed further in the
companion case of Charette.
(b) Charette
Ms. Charette was a recipient of a social assistance benefit provided
to low income families with children. This benefit was provided through
the Parental Wage Assistance Program established under the Act respecting income security41 and administered by the responsible Minister.
Conditions for obtaining the benefit included that the applicant be receiving income from employment. Ms. Charette became pregnant and
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The collective agreement incorporated the right of teachers to the full and equal exercise
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Quebec Charter. See Morin, id., at para. 66.
41
R.S.Q. c. S-3.1.1, replaced on October 1, 1999 with the Act respecting income support,
employment assistance and social solidarity, R.S.Q. c. S-32.001 [hereinafter “the Act”, “Income
Security Act”].
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took maternity leave. During her leave, the Minister discontinued her
benefits. She was told that the employment insurance that she would
receive during her maternity leave did not constitute the employment
income required to qualify her for the Parental Wage Assistance Program. Under the Act, Ms. Charette had the right to challenge the Minister’s decision at the Commission des affaires sociales (“CAS”) (now
part of the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec (“ATQ”)). Instead of
doing so, she lodged a complaint at the Quebec Human Rights Commission alleging that the Parental Wage Assistance Program discriminated
against women, particularly pregnant women, in violation of sections 10
and 12 of the Quebec Charter. The Commission then referred her complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.
The Attorney General of Quebec brought a motion before the Human Rights Tribunal asking it to decline to hear the matter on the
ground that the CAS held exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The
Human Rights Tribunal rejected the motion42 and the Attorney General’s
requests for judicial review and suspension of the Tribunal’s proceedings were rejected by the Superior Court.43 However, the Quebec Court
of Appeal reversed these orders.44 It held that the CAS had exclusive
jurisdiction and that Ms. Charette’s only recourse was to ask for review
under the administrative scheme provided in the Act.45 The issues raised
before the Supreme Court, therefore, were the narrow question of determining which administrative body the legislature intended to resolve
Ms. Charette’s claim and the broader issue of the appropriate method to
be used to analyze cases in which there are potential conflicts of jurisdiction among administrative schemes. Unlike the case in Morin, the
Court found here that the Commission des affaires sociales, not the
Human Rights Tribunal, had jurisdiction over the question of discrimination. Given the vastly different results in two cases that both allege
discrimination, the Supreme Court’s method of analysis in addressing
issues of jurisdiction ratione materiae becomes particularly interesting.
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[2000] J.T.D.P.Q. no. 6.
[2000] Q.J. no. 5646.
44
[2002] J.Q. no. 369, [2002] R.J.Q. 583.
45
The Court of Appeal also added that if her request before the CAS should fail she would
not have the option of later making a complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal. In other words, the
CAS’ remedy was the sole remedy available.
43
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The Supreme Court was far from unanimous in its result. The majority decision to dismiss the appeal in this case was split with separate
concurring reasons by two sets of two justices each. Justices Bastarache
and Arbour form one group; Binnie and Fish JJ. form the other. Justice
Bastarache and Binnie J. are the respective authors. There is also a dissent by McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci and Major JJ., penned by McLachlin
C.J.
(i) The Dissent
(A) CHIEF JUSTICE MCLACHLIN, IACOBUCCI AND MAJOR JJ.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache J. have switched roles in
this case, with Bastarache J. in the majority and the Chief Justice dissenting. As well, sounding unusually like Bastarache J. in his dissent in
Morin, McLachlin C.J. framed the issue in Charette as being “whether
the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal is deprived of jurisdiction to decide
an issue of alleged discrimination, on the ground that the legislature has
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on a different tribunal…the Commission des affaires socials.”46 She repeated this issue as being a question of
the possible ousting of the jurisdiction of the Quebec Human Rights
Tribunal because exclusive jurisdiction had been conferred on the
CAS.47 Curiously, although the Chief Justice parted company with Bastarache J. in Morin for starting his analysis from a presumption of jurisdictional exclusivity on the part of one deciding body, here her approach
is not far from his. That is to say that, in lieu of analyzing the essential
character of the facts of the case and then determining which decisionmaking body the legislature intended to decide the dispute, she presumed, by the nature of the claim (i.e., discrimination) that the Human
Rights Tribunal had jurisdiction (albeit not exclusive) and that the question was to determine if its jurisdiction was to be removed.
Chief Justice McLachlin continued with the notion of three possible
jurisdictional models that she had asserted in Morin. In her opinion, the
question was which of the three Weber models had been chosen by the
legislature. To decide this, one must consider the legislation and the
essential nature of the dispute in its factual context. Examining the legis-
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Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 1 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 5.
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lation and the nature of the dispute should ensure two things: consistency with the legislative regimes and that the tribunal with the best fit
will have jurisdiction.
Upon examining the Income Security Act and the CAS Act,
McLachlin C.J. determined that the jurisdictional model chosen by the
legislature was exclusive as opposed to overlapping or concurrent. The
CAS had exclusive jurisdiction to hear contestations of ministerial decisions relating to income security. She also found that the CAS had the
power to interpret and apply the Charter (presumably based on its ability
to decide questions of law coupled with a strong privative clause) although it had no expertise in human rights matters.
As for the essential character of the dispute, the Chief Justice asserted that we must look at whether “the dispute, viewed in its factual
matrix and not formalistically” is one over which the legislature intended the CAS to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction. In her view, Ms.
Charette’s claim dealt essentially with discrimination. She provided
three reasons to support her conclusion. First, to characterize Ms.
Charette’s claim as simply a claim for benefits under the Income Security Act as the Attorney General had done eliminated the essence of the
claim, which is that the Act and the Parental Wage Assistance Program
violated the equality rights guaranteed by the Charter. Second, the
collective aspect of Ms. Charette’s complaint would be lost if it was
viewed as a claim for benefits. The complainant was seeking a declaration not only in respect to the violation of her own equality rights but
also in respect to the rights of all pregnant women treated in the same
way. Finally, the significance of the claim would be diminished if it
had been treated simply as a claim for benefits. Viewed as such, the
implication was that the complaint dealt with the improper application
of the law instead of with the validity of the law itself. Chief Justice
McLachlin also made an analogy with Morin, pointing out that as in
Morin, there was no dispute over the way in which the benefits program was interpreted or applied. The true dispute was over the validity
of the program itself. In McLachlin C.J.’s opinion, while the Income
Security Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from rulings on
security benefits, it did not give it jurisdiction over a matter that in its
essential nature, was about gender discrimination. This was a matter
for the Human Rights Tribunal. In McLachlin C.J.’s words: “The Income Security Act does not give the CAS exclusive jurisdiction over a
dispute that, viewed in its full factual matrix, is essentially a human
rights claim about the validity of a law that affects Ms. Charette and
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many others in her situation.”48 Repeating the stance that she took in
Morin, McLachlin C.J. added that the Human Rights Tribunal was the
best fit for this dispute.49
(ii) The Majority
(A) JUSTICES BASTARACHE AND ARBOUR
Writing for himself and Arbour J., Bastarache J. saw the issue in
this case as dealing with the essential character of a dispute. More specifically, the issue concerned “the manner of determining the essential
character of a dispute when, at first glance, there appear to be two administrative bodies that could claim jurisdiction over the matter, but one
… has an exclusivity clause in its enabling statute.”50 It is interesting
that his focus was on developing the correct approach to questions of
jurisdiction. Certainly this is a helpful step in providing guidance for
administrative bodies and lower courts that will have to grapple with
these issues in the future.
Justice Bastarache’s approach is very similar to the one he took in
Morin and he once again expressed disagreement with McLachlin C.J.
over many of the same concerns. In particular, he believed that McLachlin C.J.’s analysis of the essential character had been largely influenced
by the legal characterization of Ms. Charette’s claim. He also did not
agree that the possibility of a human rights violation should have resulted in setting aside the CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction. Picking up on a
theme he had started to develop in Morin, Bastarache J. reminded us
that tribunals that can determine matters of law also have the ability to
determine Charter matters unless the legislature indicates otherwise.
Relying on Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin;
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur,51 Bastarache J.
asserted that the CAS should have the power to declare the Minister’s
decision discriminatory and any provision of the Income Security Act
that contravenes the Charter to be of no force or effect.
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Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 18.
She also observed that there would be no duplication of work (Charette, id., at para. 20).
Although McLachlin C.J. was not explicit on which of the models would exist, it seems that this
would be one of overlapping jurisdiction.
50
Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 22.
51
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [hereinafter “Martin/Laseur”].
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As he did in Morin, Bastarache J. again insisted that all aspects of a
dispute should be decided in one forum. Many of the policy concerns he
expressed in the last part of Morin, resurface more forcefully in Charette. He stressed that the resolution of a Charter question related to a
legislative scheme requires a thorough understanding of the objectives
of the scheme and of the practical implications of proposed remedies.52
The expertise of the tribunal in dealing with the administration of the
Act is undoubtedly useful in resolving Charter matters. Moreover, when
it comes to the Quebec Charter, Bastarache J. asserted, both in Morin
and here in Charette, that the Quebec legislature “has stipulated that
administrative bodies not specializing in human rights nevertheless have
a duty to enforce those rights in their decisions.”53 The goal of the legislature was to foster a general culture of respect for human rights
throughout Quebec’s entire administrative system. Lastly, he pointed to
the additional policy reason of making the Charter meaningful and accessible by having tribunals conform to it in their decision-making.
Justice Bastarache was not explicit on how he reached this conclusion about the legislated obligation imposed on administrative bodies
other than the Human Rights Tribunal to enforce human rights. He did
not make reference to any explicit stipulation in the Quebec Charter.
Based on an overall reading of his reasons, however, it may simply be
that Bastarache J. derived this obligation from the power given to many
tribunals to decide all questions of law, a power which was confirmed
last term in Martin/Laseur to incorporate the power to decide constitutional questions as well.54 Interestingly, he made no express reference to
the fact that he was expanding the case law by applying the principles of
Martin/Laseur so that they dealt with not only constitutional but also
with quasi-constitutional enactments. He also did not discuss the underlying principles that he relied on to make this expansion.55 As a result,
there has been a seamless transferral of the principles established in
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Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 27.
Charette, supra, note 2, at para. 28; See also Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 68.
54
See Martin/Laseur, supra, note 51.
55
The expansion was very likely based on the idea that quasi-constitutional enactments often also signal their primacy over other legislation enacted in their jurisdiction. The Quebec Charter
at s. 52, for example, prohibits derogation from it unless done expressly. See also the decision of
Lamer J. (as he then was) in Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
145 [hereinafter “Heerspink”] where he expressed this idea as judicial principle.
53
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Martin/Laseur for constitutional questions to the realm of quasiconstitutional questions as well.56
Finally, Bastarache J. noted that the Human Rights Tribunal would
have ended up making an order on the legality of the Minister’s decision
about benefits and may have potentially substituted its own decision.
Such actions would certainly violate the integrity of the established
legislative scheme.
Justice Bastarache concluded that the dispute essentially dealt with
Ms. Charette’s eligibility for the Parental Wage Assistance program and
was a matter that fit within the explicit mandate of the CAS. Unlike
McLachlin C.J., the fact that the claim may affect a group instead of
only one person was of minimal importance to Bastarache J. In his opinion, this fact did not serve to alter the essential nature of the dispute.
Moreover, in past cases in which the Court had found exclusive jurisdiction, such as Weber and Parry Sound, the collective aspect was no less
present.
Integrated decision-making is obviously an important and central
concern to Bastarache J. in his decisions on jurisdiction. It will be interesting to see if he manages to push it further by capturing more of the
support of the Court in future cases. It will also be interesting to see if
integrated decision-making will be limited to instances where the incidental matter to be decided by the administrative body is a constitutional
or quasi-constitutional right or if incidental matters in other subject
areas will figure in future debates as well.57
(B) JUSTICES BINNIE AND FISH
Justice Binnie provided yet a third perspective on the issue presented in Charette. More similar in nature to Bastarache J.’s perception of the issue than to that of McLachlin C.J., Binnie J. held that the
task before the Court was twofold. On the one hand, the Court had to
56

This transferral has been adopted in later Supreme Court decisions of the 2004-2005
term and has already been picked up by lower courts. See for example, the Court’s analysis in
Okwuobi and Vaid decided this term and discussed below. See also the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2004] O.J. No.
3724, 72 O.R. (3d) 457 [hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”].
57
On the question of integrated decision-making of a human rights matter see
Tranchemontagne, id., which was decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal shortly after Morin and
Charette were released. This case is scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court during the 20052006 term.
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examine two legislative schemes to determine which of the potential
adjudicative bodies the legislature intended to resolve Ms. Charette’s
claim. If more than one adjudicative body had a claim to jurisdiction,
then the Court had to determine also how this conflict of jurisdictions
should be be resolved.58 Like Bastarache J., Binnie J. is interested in
the appropriate method of analysis to resolve jurisdictional conflict.
His focus was on discerning the intention of the legislature. He believed the dissenting judges chose the correct test but erred by allowing their evaluation of the essential nature of the dispute to trump the
legislature’s clear intention to have income security benefits determined by the CAS.
Justice Binnie held that it was important to separate the factual and
legal contexts in which the dispute arose from the legal character of the
alleged wrong. It is the legislative and factual contexts, “not the legal
character of the alleged wrong, that is crucial to the allocation of jurisdiction.”59 In Binnie J.’s opinion, the facts that gave rise to this dispute
were the Minister’s discontinuance of an income security benefit and
“Ms. Charette’s claim to get it back under an administrative scheme that
the legislature in plain words has channelled directly to the CAS.”60 He
had no difficulty in defining the essential character of the dispute. He
noted that the legal wrong in this case could be characterized as a Charter complaint but that this should not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the Human Rights Tribunal had jurisdiction over the matter.
Justice Binnie focused on the fact that there was a clearly established administrative appeal route set out by the legislature. Pointing to
the statute, he observed that the legislature had indicated the appeal
route to be exclusive and that, where there are intended exceptions to
this exclusivity, the legislature signalled those explicitly.61 It is clear that
the legislature intended the CAS to have exclusive jurisdiction over
disagreements like the one concerning Ms. Charette’s discontinued
benefits. Moreover, Binnie J. criticized McLachlin C.J. for outlining and
relying on what he saw as several policy considerations favouring the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Tribunal. In his opinion, the legislature
had already designated a forum and it was for the courts to respect that
58
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choice. Later in his reasons, he reiterated his views on the importance of
respecting the separation of powers when he held that it was irrelevant
that Ms. Charette’s claim had the potential to affect many others. Justice
Binnie noted that this was a factor endemic to all Charter claims and
undoubtedly, one that the Quebec legislature took into account when it
decided to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS.62
Finally, Binnie J. offered an interesting analysis of the differences
between Morin and Charette. His comments highlight why, in his view,
the Human Rights Tribunal was determined to possess jurisdiction ratione materiae in Morin, but not in Charette. Justice Binnie provided
several reasons. He recalled, first, that in Morin, the nature of the dispute could not be characterized as a grievance under the collective
agreement (it dealt with negotiation of the agreement itself), whereas
Ms. Charette’s claim fell clearly under the Income Security Act and the
CAS was competent to deal with it. Secondly, he noted the absence of a
conflict of interest in this case. In Morin, the Court held that the union
that the complainant would approach to bring her grievance may be
opposed in interest and disinclined to do so. There was no case of conflict in Charette. Justice Binnie also noted that the CAS had jurisdiction
over all the relevant parties in Charette, whereas in Morin the grievance
arbitrator did not. For his final point, Binnie J. indicated that a collective
element is present in all Charter claims. This element will always militate toward a finding that the Human Rights regime is most appropriate.
However, Binnie J. noted that the Quebec legislature likely took this
into account in deciding to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the CAS.
Justice Binnie held:
Fourth, while the dispute here potentially affects many individuals
other than Ms. Charette, as was the case in Morin and is a
characteristic of Charter claims generally, this factor will always
favour the Commission or a Human Rights Tribunal in turf wars with
other branches of the provincial government. It is a factor which the
Quebec legislature inevitably took into account when it gave exclusive
jurisdiction over income security benefits to the CAS including the
power to adjudicate Charter arguments (subject to judicial review by
the ordinary courts).63
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This final point is perplexing and does not seem to support his thesis
at all that there are differences that generated the results in Morin and
Charette. It may be that Binnie J. was indicating that there is greater
room to consider the collective aspect of a claim, a factor which points
toward the jurisdiction of a human rights tribunal, when the competing
adjudicative body is not a branch of provincial government. If so, that is
a strange comment to make as it goes against his own finding in Charette. It is also unclear why such a distinction should be made. Presumably, the potential for conflict with the Human Rights Tribunal, if indeed
thought through systematically at the stage of legislative development,
would have been considered for all decision-making bodies designed by
the provincial legislature, whether a branch of provincial government or
not. A question that may be worth further exploration in the competing
jurisdiction cases, however, is whether the legislature indeed anticipated
and thought through such conflicts at the time of drafting the relevant
pieces of legislation.
The cases dealing with jurisdiction have thus far dealt with the Quebec human rights regime and its interplay with other legislative schemes
within the Quebec administrative law system. Two additional cases
addressing the question of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction were
also decided last term: Vaid and Okwuobi. The next case, Vaid, is interesting because of its very unencumbered treatment of the jurisdictional
question. It also provides a further glimpse of the Court’s treatment of
quasi-constitutional, human rights legislation.
(c) Vaid
Vaid is a case with constitutional law, administrative law and human
rights dimensions. Mr. Vaid was a chauffeur to the Speaker of the
House of Commons. He believed he had been constructively dismissed
for reasons of discrimination and harassment and lodged a complaint
with the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The House of Commons
and the Speaker raised a preliminary objection, arguing that Parliamentary privilege allowed the Senate and the House of Commons to conduct
their employee relations free from interference from the Canadian Human Rights Commission or any other body outside Parliament itself. A
large portion of the Supreme Court’s judgment was therefore devoted to
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the constitutional question of whether the parliamentary privilege
claimed could be said to exist.64 The Supreme Court decision was unanimous. Justice Binnie, writing for the Court, held that the privilege
claimed did not exist and that the appellants could not succeed on that
ground. He then moved on to address the administrative law issue. Specifically, this was the question of whether the Canadian Human Rights
Commission and Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Vaid’s complaint
of harassment and discrimination or whether his complaint was a matter
for the grievance process established under the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act.65
Examining the relevant statutory provisions of the Canadian Human
Rights Act,66 Binnie J. first addressed the question of whether Parliamentary employees fell within the application of the Act. With reference to
modern principles of statutory interpretation which require, among other
things, that legislation be given fair, large and liberal construction to
ensure that it attain its goals,67 principles which Binnie J. asserted apply
with special force in the application of human rights laws,68 Binnie J.
held that the Human Rights Act applied to employees of Parliament. In
his view, it was not necessary for the Act to indicate expressly that Parliamentary employees are included within the scope of its application; it
is simply enough that the language of the statute show no indication that
it intends to exclude them from it.
Justice Binnie then examined the question of whether Mr. Vaid’s
claim was within PESRA’s exclusive authority. He found that the complaint was essentially just a grievance raising a human rights issue and
that PESRA’s exclusivity clause69 ousted the jurisdiction of the bodies
established under the Canadian Human Rights Act.
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The Human Rights Tribunal held that they did possess jurisdiction over the matter. On
judicial review, the Federal Court, Trial Division, upheld the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal. On further appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the decision was affirmed. (See Vaid v.
Canada (House of Commons), [2001] C.H.R.D. No. 15, affd [2001] F.C.J. No. 1818, [2002] 2. F.C.
583 (T.D.), affd [2002] F.C.J. No. 1663, [2003] 1 F.C. 602 (C.A.)).
65
R.S.C. 1985, c. 33 (2nd Supp.) [hereinafter “PESRA”].
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R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
67
Justice Binnie relied on the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; R. v. Sharpe,
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68
Vaid, id., at para. 80.
69
This clause, PESRA, s. 2, reads:

68

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 30 S.C.L.R. (2d)

As with the two cases emanating from Quebec, it is extremely fascinating to note how the jurisdictional issue was resolved in this decision. The Court took the test for competing jurisdiction from McLachlin
C.J. in Morin:
[…]the question in each case is whether the relevant legislation
applied to the dispute at issue, taken in its full factual context,
established that the labour arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction over the
dispute.70

But the problem with this formulation of the test is that it does not
present a symmetrical approach to determining the question. In its purest form, a general approach to competing jurisdictions, whether involving a labour dispute or not, should simply be to examine which of two
or more decision-making bodies was intended to have jurisdiction, given
that the three models exist. The McLachlin formulation in Morin was
given as more of a réplique to Bastarache J.’s idea of exclusivity than a
general approach. Exclusivity on the part of one decision-making body,
whether explicit or presumed, will not always be a factor to consider in
the analysis.
As well, the essential nature of the dispute was not a contentious issue at all in this case. The Court had no difficulty classifying Mr. Vaid’s
complaint as a workplace complaint that raised an incidental human
rights issue. One reason for this ease of classification stemmed from the
ability to compare this case to the facts of Morin and Charette, which
were also human rights cases. As the test and process of analysis have
not gotten any easier, however, it would not be surprising for divisions
in the court to arise again in future cases. As Binnie J. observes: “[t]his
is not an area of the law that lends itself to overgeneralization.”71
A curious aspect of the case is that the facts giving rise to the dispute are taken from the complaint filed by Mr. Vaid at the Human
Rights Commission. It is probably anomalous that the complainant’s
facts were written in such a way as to lead him away from being granted

[…] except as provided in this Act, nothing in any other Act of Parliament that provides
for matters similar to those provided for under this Act and nothing done thereunder, whether
before or after the coming into force of this section, shall apply to or in respect of or have any
force or effect in relation to the institutions and persons described in this section.
70
Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 92, citing McLachlin C.J. in Morin, supra, note 1, at para. 14.
71
Vaid, supra, note 3, at para. 95.
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the forum of his choice. But, certainly this is a reminder to litigants to
do as much as possible to present the facts in a way that will appeal to
the court to grant them the forum desired.
Finally, the analysis in Vaid raises a couple of additional points for
reflection. Firstly, the Court’s holding indicates implicitly that the wording in section 2 of PESRA is sufficient to displace the requirements of
quasi-constitutional, human rights legislation. The Court did not discuss
the matter directly. However, it noted from cases like Heerspink that
“express and unequivocal language”72 to the contrary is necessary to be
certain of the legislature’s intent that a human rights enactment is not to
supersede all other laws. Secondly, Vaid is the last of three cases on
competing forum this term, all of which involved one body with express
or implied exclusivity. It will be interesting to see how the Court’s approach changes, if at all, when faced with two bodies possessing concurrent jurisdiction.
(d) Determining Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae — Reflections
Almost immediately upon reading Morin, Charette and Vaid one
notes that the Court has struggled in defining the test to be applied and,
by extension, the method of analysis for determining the legislator’s
intention for the applicable forum. Perhaps the cases on exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction can be classified as a struggle for the best way to
determine legislative intent. A few approaches have emerged from the
cases this term. In some instances, it seems that the judges look for an
indication that the legislature intended to remove the matter at hand
from the body that on its face would appear seized of it. This is the
approach taken by Bastarache J. in Morin and Charette and to a large
extent also McLachlin C.J. in her dissenting opinion in Charette. Other
approaches are more neutral. In Morin, we see the Chief Justice propose
that the relevant legislation and the facts be examined to determine the
nature of the jurisdiction — exclusive, concurrent or overlapping — the
legislature intended for the particular dispute (although arguably this is
not the approach she actually uses). There are to be no presuppositions
about the existence of exclusivity or other models of jurisdiction simply
because of past jurisprudence or the wording of the statute alone. Justice
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Binnie also presents a more neutral, balanced approach. Faced with
conflicting jurisdictions, he asked simply which body the legislature
intended to resolve the dispute. In Charette and Vaid, for example, he
focused primarily on the language of the statute without becoming too
encumbered in defining the essential character of the dispute.
But mixed in with these approaches are more normatively driven
policy perspectives held by some that interfere, rightly or wrongly, with
the pure pursuit of legislative intent. An example is to have all matters
arising from one dispute decided in one place; another is the belief that
widespread, collective remedies are best-suited for human rights violations. Justice Bastarache, for example, is a strong supporter of the idea
that tribunals have the right to decide human rights matters either under
the power conferred by Parry Sound or by the principles derived from
Martin/Laseur giving tribunals Charter jurisdiction.
This mixture of legislative intent and policy represents a tension between two values that have become central in the administrative state.
Essentially, this is a contest between expertise and expediency and
based on these cases, it is a contest in which expediency often wins. One
cannot help but experience difficulty in deciding who is correct in cases
like Morin and Charette, as evidenced by the many divides in the decisions themselves. Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach to the problems
before her emphasizes the importance of valuing specialized bodies for
the expertise they can bring to the matter and for their capacity to fashion appropriate remedies — for example, the ability of human rights
tribunals to fashion systemic remedies. Her reasoning implies that it is
because of their expertise that the legislature has created these bodies
and that we should turn to them to provide the most suitable remedy. In
this way, deference is shown to the will of the legislature in the larger
sense of the term. It is not just that the words of two enabling statutes
are examined to determine legislative intent; deference is shown to the
fact that the legislature has designed an overall set of bodies, each with
its own area of expertise and function within the administrative state.
Given that expertise is a hallmark of tribunal existence — one of the
reasons that tribunals were often created73 and certainly, as articulated
by the Supreme Court, the most important reason for which deference
should be granted to a tribunal in determining the appropriate standard
73
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of review74 — there is a very strong basis for the legitimacy of this approach.
The opposing view tends to see more value in expediency. We
know that the administrative justice system has been designed to provide inexpensive, faster, efficient results for the litigant.75 Requiring an
individual to go to more than one tribunal to have a dispute settled
seems contrary to these goals. These ideas are reflected in the decisions
rendered by Bastarache J. Yet, it is difficult to conceive of speed and
convenience as goals more worthy of pursuit than providing experience
and expertise in decisions rendered. Such a perspective overlooks the
qualitative value of the tribunals themselves. It is not just quick, convenient resolutions that the individual litigant seeks, but the most appropriate resolution possible to a specific problem. This leads to a final point
in the debate between expertise and expediency: the role of the individual in the battle over jurisdictional conflict. It seems unusual that not
much emphasis has been placed on the desire of the litigant to have his
or her dispute heard in a particular forum. We have seen how difficult it
is to find the one essential character of a dispute. Cases like Morin and
Charette simply reinforce that a dispute often has a multiplicity of character rather than one essential character. In such situations, one would
think that the individual litigant’s way of seeing the dispute would be
useful to determining the correct forum. Questions about jurisdictional
conflict are not about disputes and legislative will in the abstract. They
are disputes over something that has happened to an individual about
which the individual would like to complain in a specific way. It may be
a personal matter, as in a workplace disagreement, or it may be a matter
for which the main point of complaining is to prevent the same thing
from happening to others, such as in a case of alleged discrimination. If
more than one fora are possible, the courts cannot simply redesign the
facts to fit into one forum or the other. The search for essential character
74
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must be anchored in the litigant’s view, otherwise the essence of the
dispute risks being diminished. This is McLachlin C.J.’s point in Charette. One could also take the point further and note that to redesign the
dispute in such a way not only risks diminishing the dispute, it also risks
disempowering the litigant.
On a practical level, as these problems work themselves out, questions remain regarding how a litigant is to know which tribunal is the
correct one to address his or her concern. Tribunal decision-makers are
also sure to be concerned over the challenge of making correct firstlevel decisions to accept or decline jurisdiction. With all the separate
concurring reasons and various approaches, the law on the question of
jurisdiction ratione materiae offers support for many diverging propositions, making the law uncertain both in the jurisprudence and as a practical reality for tribunal members and users.
From a theoretical and policy perspective, we have seen a shift in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, highlighted in other cases as well,
like Ocean Port, in which the Court has emphasized the will of the
legislature. However, at the same time, one does not hear much talk of
empirical evidence that the creation of tribunals across any level of
government has been done in a systematic way, with emphasis on avoiding conflicts. The exclusive jurisdiction jurisprudence may be seen as a
call to legislators and policy-makers to dedicate more attention to foreseeing problems of jurisdictional conflict and to be clearer in identifying
legislative intent. More unification in the legislative process may be
necessary. Finally, the notion of “jurisdictional analysis” began its decline with the line of cases starting with Bibeault76 which introduced a
pragmatic and functional approach and touted the importance of discerning legislative intent. It is somewhat of a paradox that today, in the
process of searching for legislative intent, we have once again entered a
strong debate over matters of jurisdiction.
With the next case, Okwuobi, we move further along the spectrum
of jurisdictional interaction. At this point, we are moving away from
conflicts between administrative regimes to revisit the question of the
appropriate balance of judicial intervention and restraint in the interaction between courts and tribunals.
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2. Residual Remedial Jurisdiction of the Courts: Okwuobi
Okwuobi forms part of a trilogy of cases in which the Court determined whether a provision of the Quebec Charter of the French language77 violated the rights to equality guaranteed by the Charter of
human rights and freedoms78 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.79 While the trilogy predominantly addresses constitutional
law issues,80 Okwuobi, the third case in the series, examines the ability
of the superior courts to supplement the jurisdiction of an administrative
body that has been given exclusive authority over a matter but may not
be able to provide the remedy sought. The case is significant because it
provides guiding principles for determining when a superior court can
intervene to provide injunctive relief and hear direct constitutional challenges. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court’s guidance is
extremely vague, leaving the judgment somewhat disappointing. The
holding in Okwuobi was that supplementary remedial assistance was not
required from the Court. The facts of Okwuobi, therefore, do not enable
us to glean a picture of precise situations when supplementary remedial
jurisdiction will be granted. The Court also offered no examples. As a
result, we must wait and see how the question will be handled by the
lower courts and whether the Supreme Court will ultimately approve.
The decision in Okwuobi comprises an appeal by three appellants,
heard jointly at the Supreme Court. As mentioned, it is a case dealing with
entitlement to minority language education in Quebec. After the Minister
of Education denied English language instruction to the children of the
appellants, each applied to the Superior Court for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Charter of the French language violated
the Canadian Charter. In taking this route, the appellants bypassed the
administrative appeal process that had been established under the Act
respecting administrative justice.81 For two of the appellants, the Superior
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Court declined to hear the matter, holding that the ATQ had exclusive
jurisdiction over their appeals. These judgments were upheld at the Court
of Appeal. In the case of the third appellant, the Superior Court held that it
possessed jurisdiction over the matter. At the Court of Appeal, this decision was reversed.
The Supreme Court held that the ATQ had exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions regarding eligibility for minority language
instruction. The Court also relied on Martin/Laseur and Paul to conclude that the ATQ’s explicit power to decide questions of law empowered it to consider incidental constitutional questions. The Court held
that the claimants could not circumvent the administrative appeal process set up through the ATQ. The legislature intended the ATQ’s jurisdiction to be exclusive and courts should respect the intention of the
legislature. The appellants had argued that the ATQ did not have jurisdiction over all the parties and that it could grant neither an injunction
nor a declaration of constitutional invalidity. The Court found, by contrast, that the ATQ had express authority to implead parties necessary
for complete resolution of the dispute. It also noted that the ATQ had
been granted broad remedial powers under its enabling statute that may
have the potential to be used in a manner similar to a formal injunction.
The only remedy sought that the ATQ could not grant was a declaration.
Nevertheless, the Court held that absence of this remedy was not a reason to circumvent the administrative process. In the Court’s opinion,
judicial review is always available and the party can seek a declaration
at that time.
A principle that emerges from this case is that a litigant does not
have the right to bypass an administrative scheme simply because the
scheme does not provide a remedy sought. This is an admonition to both
litigants and courts. The Supreme Court emphasized its opinion that
courts must respect the intention of the legislature. Throughout the decision, one finds a related and equally strong theme — namely, that the
courts should not use their powers to weaken the administrative process,
but only to complement it. Consequently, we see that with respect to
providing injunctive relief, the Court held that judicial discretion to do
so should only be exercised to “fill in the cracks in the administrative
process.”82 Recourse to urgent injunctive relief should remain a rare
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exception and should not be used to avoid a tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction or to obtain a review of its decision.83
Similarly, with respect to the ability of superior courts to entertain
direct constitutional challenges, the Court held that the superior courts
should only act when required to “fill the remedial vacuum.”84 Superior
courts possess inherent jurisdiction to ensure that there is adherence to
the Constitution. Their remedial function is therefore particularly pertinent when dealing with constitutional remedies. However, superior
courts should play a role in providing remedies only in situations where
the legislature has endowed an administrative body with the power to
decide constitutional questions but not the power to grant the most appropriate and just remedy. It is only in such situations that the superior
courts can step in. Okwuobi was not such a case. Unfortunately, the
Court does not go further in describing the situations in which a direct
application to the superior court for constitutional remedy would be
acceptable. All the Court says for certain is that it would not be one in
which the applicants were trying to bypass the administrative scheme
altogether. How much of a remedy is needed before the superior court
can step in and how the most appropriate remedy will be determined in
such cases — for example, whether it will simply be a question of what
is provided in the courts or whether some aspects of the administrative
scheme will be incorporated — are questions left for another day.
On another level, Okwuobi is interesting because the Court is unanimous in its analytical approach to the question of jurisdiction. Yet, the
entire “essential character” test is bypassed, not even mentioned. In its
place, the only tests applied were those dealing with the constitutional
jurisdiction of tribunals derived from Martin/Laseur and Paul. It is difficult to know how to reconcile this with the earlier jurisprudence, as the
Court has not been clear in distinguishing the situations in which to apply
the essential character test from those in which to apply the jurisprudence
dealing with the constitutional jurisdiction of tribunals. One way of reconciling the case law on concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction is to note
that the question in cases like Okwuobi deal with whether the tribunal in
fact had the powers necessary to fulfill the mandate given to it in theory.
83
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It was clear that the Quebec legislature had granted the ATQ the power to
determine language entitlement appeals. It was also undisputed that this
was a language entitlement appeal. The question at issue was whether, in
the course of deciding such appeals, the ATQ could also decide necessary
constitutional matters such as the validity under the Charter of provisions
of the statute it was handling. To answer this question, the Court needed
only to apply the jurisprudence on the constitutional powers of tribunals:
namely, Martin/Laseur and Paul. It was not necessary to enter into the
essential character test in Okwuobi as it had been in previous cases like
Weber, Morin and Charette, because the debate in Okwuobi was not
about fitting a dispute within the relatively uncontested powers of a tribunal. This is one possible way of reconciling the approaches taken to exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction; there are undoubtedly others.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will take an opportunity to clarify the situations in which the different tests apply in the near future.
Finally, Okwuobi is also useful for its in-depth review of the ATQ’s
powers, structure and, in particular, its overview of the ATQ’s ability to
deal with Canadian Charter matters.

III.

THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION: VAUGHAN

Vaughan is one of those engaging cases that deal with the relationship
between courts and tribunals. At issue in Vaughan was whether courts
should show deference to a statutory scheme when that scheme does not
provide a right to third-party independent adjudication. Decided the same
month as Okwuobi, Vaughan adds another chapter to the Supreme Court’s
discussion of when courts should and should not step in to supplement
dispute resolution processes designed by the legislature.
Vaughan concerns labour relations and has a very similar feel to Weber. Mr. Vaughan was a federal employee who brought an action in negligence in an effort to have the issue of whether he was entitled to Early
Retirement Incentive (“ERI”) benefits resolved through independent
adjudication. Under the Public Service Staff Relations Act85 (“PSSRA”)
employee benefits were divided into two types. The first type of benefit
included those negotiated as part of the collective agreement; the second
included those the government has provided unilaterally by regulation.
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The Act provided that negotiated benefits were arbitrable while those
provided unilaterally were grievable but could not go to third-party arbitration. ERI benefits were unilaterally conferred by regulation. For these
benefits, there was a multi-level internal grievance process which allowed the grievance to be pursued up to the level of the Deputy Minister. However, the Act did not provide for arbitration after this last level
of grievance.
The case before the Supreme Court originated in a preliminary motion to strike out the action in negligence.86 The motion had been granted
by a Prothonotary of the Federal Court, who held that the jurisdiction of
the courts was ousted by the PSSRA’s statutory scheme. This decision
was then affirmed at all levels of the Federal Court.87 At issue was
whether the courts should offer a concurrent forum to resolve matters
relating to unilaterally provided employee benefits because the scheme
created under the PSSRA did not provide for adjudication of these matters by an independent third party. The question was therefore one related to procedural fairness. If an administrative decision-making
process does not provide the guarantees of procedural fairness required
at common law and the legislation does not specify that this process is
to be exclusive, should the lack of procedural fairness be understood as
an indication that the legislature intended the administrative scheme to
be concurrent with the courts?
It was anticipated that the decision in Vaughan would explain the role
that the right to procedural fairness should play in determining whether
the legislature has implicitly intended an administrative scheme to have
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts. In cases where the enabling legislation does not indicate expressly that an administrative body is to have
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, it becomes necessary to
see if such legislative intent can be inferred. Drawing inferences of legislative intent involves, among other things, examining the statute(s) as a
whole and considering the manner in which the administrative process
operates in practice. However, at the time that Vaughan arose in the
courts, the jurisprudence was not clear on how determinative a finding of
lack of procedural fairness on the part of an administrative scheme should
86
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be. The Supreme Court had not yet addressed the question and, as Evans
J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal noted in his thorough review of provincial and federal court decisions, the question had not been directly
addressed by the appellate courts either.88 What was expected by many in
Vaughan was guidance on a pressing question raised at the Federal Court
of Appeal — namely, in cases where legislative intent must be inferred,
should the fact that an administrative scheme does not provide common
law guarantees of procedural fairness be enough to indicate that exclusive
jurisdiction was not intended by the legislature?
Unfortunately, Vaughan did not answer this question. The majority’s holding was that there should be judicial restraint — that is, that
the courts should defer to the PSSRA grievance procedure in this case.
The Court’s reasons relied on statutory interpretation but were based
quite heavily on normative and practical considerations as well. With
respect to the statute, the Court held that while the language of the
PSSRA was not strong enough to oust the jurisdiction of the courts,
courts should nevertheless defer to its grievance process. Without much
explanation, Binnie J. stated that the statutory language sent a clear
signal that the decision reached at the end of the grievance process is to
be final.89 He also noted that the grievance procedure was effective, in
the sense that it provided a remedy and could be used to resolve the
particular dispute at issue. On a more normative level, Binnie J. opined
that courts should not jeopardize the comprehensive dispute resolution
process contained in the statute by allowing routine access to the
courts.90 He disagreed with the argument that decision-making schemes
that do not provide for third-party adjudication are not worthy of deference. He noted that lack of adjudication is a consideration outweighed
by greater clues that Parliament intended to create a comprehensive
scheme. Justice Binnie pointed out as well that Mr. Vaughan’s argument
implied conflict of interest and bias on the part of the department whose
officials may have had an interest in denying eligible employees ERI
88
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benefits, but that he did not accept this argument.91 Finally, Binnie J.
outlined two practical reasons why deference should be accorded by the
courts. The first was that the labour dispute resolution process was faster
and less costly; the second was that the dispute was straightforward and
“essentially an administrative matter best left to the administrators.”
Given the number of federal public service employees, the floodgates of
litigation could be opened by opening the door to this type of dispute.
Overall, the majority’s decision is somewhat disappointing — none of
the reasons presented have much support or delve very deeply into the
issue.
Justice Bastarache and McLachlin C.J. formed the dissent in this
case. In contrast to the majority, they took the general approach that the
courts “should refrain from preventing access to independent adjudication in the absence of a clear manifestation of Parliament’s intent in this
regard.”92 They held that there was concurrent jurisdiction between the
courts and the grievance system set up under the PSSRA. A particularly
interesting aspect of their dissent is that they develop and discuss factors
to consider in determining whether the legislature intended a labour
dispute resolution process to be exclusive. They concluded:
In sum, although s. 91 of the PSSRA creates a comprehensive and
efficient dispute resolution regime, the unavailability of independent
adjudication, combined with the absence of mandatory language in the
wording of the statute and lack of expertise of the employer-appointed
decision maker, points away from a finding of exclusive jurisdiction.
Consequently, employees should not be precluded from commencing
an action in the courts.93

Although the dissent listed the unavailability of independent adjudication, the absence of mandatory language in the wording in the statute
and lack of expertise of the employer-appointed decision-maker as the
factors to consider, they also considered others in their analysis. These
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include the comprehensiveness of the dispute resolution scheme and the
availability of a remedy. Particularly noteworthy in terms of remedy is
that the dissenting judges did not find that judicial review was an adequate substitute for independent adjudication of the claims on their
merits. They also stressed that it is not just the fact of independence in
the dispute resolution process that is important but that the independent
decision-maker have expertise. While these factors have been developed
within the labour context and in dissent, they certainly provide food for
thought as to the considerations that should be relevant generally in
establishing which of the three models of jurisdiction (concurrent, overlapping or exclusive) the legislature intended when the legislation is not
explicit.
At first blush, it is also surprising to find Bastarache J. in the dissenting minority in Vaughan. He had unwaveringly defended the concept of the exclusivity of arbitral jurisdiction in Morin and, in Charette,
had championed the idea of tribunals deciding incidental human rights
matters in the course of their work in order to keep as many aspects of a
dispute as possible in one forum. To then support concurrent jurisdiction
between courts and the federal labour relations regime established for
public servants seems completely out of step. However, Bastarache J.’s
apparent change of heart highlights an aspect of his prior arguments that
had not been obvious. Central to his support for exclusive jurisdiction in
the labour relations regime is the fact that it promises independent adjudication in the form of an expert arbitrator. For Bastarache J., access to
an independent expert adjudicator is a crucial pre-condition to finding
deference for structures of labour resolution.94 The dissenting judges
admit that if the legislature is clear in asserting that it has preferred a
decision-making system that provides for decision-making without
third-party adjudication at its culmination then the courts are obliged to
respect this choice. However, they held that in this case, the statute does
not present an unequivocal statement to this effect.
Justice Bastarache’s conclusion casts a pall over the legitimacy of
such state designed processes, especially since he also implies that judicial review is not a sufficient remedy for processes in which independent adjudication does not exist. In contrast to Binnie J., his reasoning
may be interpreted as inferring a perception of bias in such processes.
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Finally, one also cannot help but notice the link between this case and
the recent jurisprudence on the requirements for tribunal independence.
Vaughan could also be seen as a case regarding the degree of independence required by a tribunal, in which case the issue would turn on
whether the legislature was clear in its intention to make a decisionmaking process without independent adjudication.95 Indeed, the judges
who wrote the majority concurring reasons at the Federal Court of Appeal discussed the issue from this perspective and they found that the
legislation was clear in indicating that the model of no arbitration was to
be the final and exclusive forum.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW: MUGESERA AND
SECONDARY LEVELS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The case of Mugesera dealt primarily with substantive elements of
immigration and criminal law. A high profile case, Mugesera considered the issue of whether a political figure in Rwanda, Léon Mugesera,
had incited murder, genocide and hatred and committed a crime against
humanity in Rwanda through a speech he delivered. The content of the
speech led the Rwandan authorities to issue the equivalent of an arrest
warrant against him and he fled the country, eventually taking up permanent residence in Canada. In 1995, the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration commenced deportation proceedings under the Immigration Act,96 on the ground that Mr. Mugesera had committed a criminal
act or offence prior to being granted permanent residency. Mr. Mugesera was ordered deported by an adjudicator on July 11, 1996. He received a hearing de novo by the Immigration and Refugee Board
(Appeal Division) (“IAD”), which upheld the decision of the adjudicator.97 On judicial review, the Federal Court, Trial Division, reversed the
decision in part. The Trial Judge found that there was no basis for the
allegations of crimes against humanity and misrepresentation but that
the allegations regarding incitement to murder and incitement to genocide and hatred were valid. He afforded great deference to the IAD’s
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findings of fact, reviewing on a standard of patent unreasonableness.98
The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Mugesera’s appeal. In reaching this outcome, however, the Court of Appeal re-evaluated the findings of fact made by the IAD.99
From an administrative law perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mugesera is interesting for its discussion of the applicable standard of review by a court conducting a secondary level of appellate
review. In Mugesera, this describes the situation of the Federal Court of
Appeal in its review of the Immigration Appeal Division decision. The
Supreme Court held that the Federal Court of Appeal had “exceeded the
scope of its judicial review function when it engaged in a broad-ranging
review and reassessment of the IAD’s findings of fact.”100 It had implicitly applied a standard of correctness and reviewed the evidence as if it
were the trier of fact. The Supreme Court reminds us that “[i]n a judicial
review process, it is not open to the reviewing court to reverse a decision because it would have arrived at a different conclusion.”101
While the Supreme Court’s holding in this case is not new, it is a
useful reaffirmation of the principles relating to the appropriate relationship between courts and tribunals on judicial review.

V. EXPERTISE AND DEFERENCE: MONSANTO
Monsanto deals with the concept of the core expertise of an administrative tribunal, the expertise for which deference will be shown under
the pragmatic and functional analysis used to determine the appropriate
standard of review. It also discusses the ability of the parties to influence the degree of deference to be chosen by reviewing courts.
The main issue in Monsanto concerned the obligations that exist on
employers upon a partial wind up of a pension plan. More specifically,
the question addressed was whether subsection 70(6) of the Ontario
Pension Benefits Act102 requires an actuarial surplus to be distributed to
plan members when a pension plan goes through only a partial wind up.
After the Superintendent of Financial Services, the provincial pension
98
99
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regulator, refused to approve the partial wind up report of Monsanto
Canada Inc. because it did not provide for distribution of surplus assets,
the matter came before the Financial Services Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).
The Tribunal held that subsection 70(6) of the Act did not require distribution. On appeal, the Ontario Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal’s decision and the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional
Court decision.103
At the Divisional Court level, the Court reviewed the Tribunal decision on a standard of reasonableness and the Court of Appeal held that
the Divisional Court was correct in doing so. Before the Supreme Court,
the parties submitted an agreement that the standard of review should be
reasonableness. The Supreme Court held, however, that because the
standard of review is a question of law, it cannot be determined by
agreement of the parties.104 Moreover, applying the four factors of the
pragmatic and functional test, the Court determined, unlike the lower
courts, that correctness was the appropriate standard of review. The
Court held, in particular, that the factors dealing with relative expertise
of the tribunal and the nature of the problem signalled that less deference should be owed. Under its enabling statute, the Tribunal had responsibility for adjudicating in more than one area and it was primarily
adjudicative. As well, its members did not necessarily arrive with expertise in pensions although the statute advised that in appointing members
to the Tribunal and assigning panels “to the extent practicable, expertise
and experience in the regulated sectors should be taken into account.”105
In the Court’s opinion, there was “little to indicate that the legislature
intended to create a body with particular expertise over the statutory
interpretation of the Act.”106 The Court held also that the nature of the
problem was a “pure question of law” that was not at the core of the
tribunal’s expertise.107
It is very difficult to comprehend how the act of interpreting a question about pension wind up is not within the core expertise of a body set
up to decide pension appeals, even if there are other subject matters that
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the Tribunal handles as well. However, the decision in Monsanto seems
to form part of a trend. According less deference to tribunal interpretations of provisions of their statutes which also may have a common law
meaning has been the result in other recent Supreme Court cases. In
addition to Monsanto, one finds a similar finding on deference in recent
cases like Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn.108
where it was held that no deference is owed to the CRTC in its interpretation of what constitutes “the supporting structure of a transmission
line” under the Telecommunications Act.109 This trend is somewhat disconcerting. As I have argued elsewhere, the decisions made by tribunals
— in individual cases, vis-à-vis the public interest or in their delegated
rule-making functions — are part of the development of governmental
policy aimed to regulate the social or economic industry they have been
called upon to manage.110 Their interpretations of the statutes they administer are necessarily informed by the experiences they have acquired
in the management of their sector. One would imagine that the tribunal’s
interpretation of the provisions of these statutes should attract some
deference, even if these provisions may also have an ordinary meaning
at common law, for in creating the tribunal, the legislature has made the
choice to allow this decision-maker instead of the courts to determine
the meanings appropriate to the regulation of an industry. An important
part of what shapes the tribunal’s interpretation are experiences that
stem from the daily operational context of administering its legislation,
a context that the legislature has entrusted the tribunal to develop in
order to effectively regulate its sector.111 As Dickson J. (as he then was)
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held in Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.:112
The labour board is a specialized tribunal which administers a
comprehensive statute regulating labour relations. In the
administration of that regime, a board is called upon not only to find
facts and decide questions of law, but also to exercise its
understanding of the body of jurisprudence that has developed around
the collective bargaining system, as understood in Canada, and its
labour relations sense acquired from accumulated experience in the
area.113

Although he was speaking of the labour board, these ideas are generally applicable. However, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Monsanto
suggests that the concept of a tribunal administering a statute disappears
in situations where the tribunal has been set up to review decisions made
in more than one regulatory sector. It presupposes that the administration of a statute only occurs when a tribunal has been established to take
care of one unique statute and to do so as a primary decision-maker. But
there is no reason to believe that review-oriented bodies do not have
expertise in the statutes over which they have jurisdiction. Can regulating a sector under a statutory regime realistically be parsed in the manner suggested by the Supreme Court? Moreover, the Court’s general
approach of deference to the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec, a review body with wide-ranging powers over several statutes, as seen in
other cases this term such as Okwuobi is also hard to reconcile with
Monsanto.
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Monsanto reflects
these considerations and offers an approach that pays respect to both
legislative intention and administrative law practicalities:
The Act gives the Tribunal the central adjudicative role in the
specialized administrative structure set up to regulate pensions in
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Ontario. While the Tribunal deals with other regulated sectors in
addition to pensions, the Financial Services Commission of Ontario
Act requires that, to the extent practicable, members are appointed
with experience and expertise in the regulated sectors and that they are
assigned to cases which draw on that experience and expertise. Hence
the Tribunal must be seen as having a relative expertise in adjudicating
questions relating to pensions.114

Overall, the trend signalled by Monsanto highlights some of the possible
dangers of interpreting too narrowly legislative intent with respect to
expertise.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the 2004-2005 Supreme Court term saw intense activity centred on the exercise of determining legislative intent. Most of
the Court’s attention was focused on deciding questions of jurisdiction
ratione materiae. The deep divides among members of the Court regarding the most appropriate method to use when dealing with two
competing administrative tribunals led to a revisitation of the Weber
principles and has invited us to consider the need to incorporate parameters and guiding factors into the “essential character” test. In what I have
termed a contest between expertise and expediency, the cases decided
this term on exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction between tribunals
have shown an unfortunate tendency to favour convenient process at the
expense of experienced decision-making. Considering the wishes of the
individual litigant and whether there should be limitations on the nature
of the facts to be examined in the “essential character test” would be
useful. Generally, the tests to be used leave many unanswered questions
and much room for development in the jurisprudence. It is more than
likely that the issues the Court has faced surrounding exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction this term will resurface in the future.115 All told,
one cannot help but note the resurgence of jurisdictional type questions
114
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this term; or to note that the search for legislative intent that was created
to take administrative law away from “jurisdictional” or “collateral”
questions has ironically led to a renewed examination of jurisdiction,
this time couched within the context of legislative intent. After a very
intense term, one looks forward to following the path of development
that the administrative law jurisprudence will take next term.

